WHAT CAN THE SAFETY COORDINATION DO FOR YOU?

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the progress we all made over the last 12 months, looking at the safety procedures (AOC ,VIC, ADI) define our strong points and see how we can improve them. Identify the weak points and highlight the problems.

Build in safety from the conception stage of "ALL" project including the LHC, define the rule and regulation, ensure they exist, that they are clear and the same for "ALL".

Show how close team work between all actors and in particular the safety coordination and general coordination will help with the organization for future shut downs. Make available a database for all relevant documentation (DIMR, PPSPS, SAFETY FILES, etc).

Pin point the areas that need to be improved, to enables the organization to move forward in such a way that the CERN remains the center of excellence throughout the world in all domains.

RESPONSIBILITY

Safety responsibilities follow an executive line starting at the very top with the Director General, Directors, Department Leaders, Group and Section Leaders, down as far as each and every individual CERN staff member.

In November 2006 the Director-General Mr. R. Aymar entrusted to the Safety Commission to carry out a full revision of SAPOCO 42 and issue a coherent set of safety rules. He further stated in a later publication in December 2007, which coincided with the updated version of the new SAPOCO 42, that one of the important objectives of his mandate was to improve Safety at CERN. The most important change was that "ALL" executive 1 tasks aimed at ensuring the Safety of the personnel and the equipment shall be the sole responsibility of the Departments, who shall also be responsible for the effectiveness. With the change of Director-General in 2009 the political statement has remained the same, the SAPOCO 42 document is still being updated, and only time will tell if the necessary means are made available to ensure that the statement becomes reality.

In some departments there would seem to be a real policy in place that wants to create a real safety culture. To enable the organization as a whole to improve its safety culture the direction must come from the management at the highest level. This will also require a complete change in attitude of many members of staff in their everyday working lives. Anyone can write a safety policy, but it takes real commitment on behalf of everyone in the Organisation to create and implement a complete safety culture. If we are to create a real safety culture at CERN, safety must come first and everyone involved should be taken into consideration, Safety Procedures must not simply be done to keep people happy with the hope of avoiding accidents. Safety should never be viewed as business risk or cost. If we can develop high standards in the work place a safety culture should be risk free and a profitable venture. By implementing and maintaining the safety culture from the conception stage of a project, and keeping it in place for the lifecycle of the project, the Organisation can not only reduce the number of accidents and incidents but also save valuable time and money. This is why safety must be built in from the conception stage of any new project. This is not systematically the case today at CERN, it must be said however that in nearly all new projects safety plays a vital role at CERN. Furthermore we can no longer tolerate "special situations" kingdoms within kingdoms. All work, tests and interventions must be planned, prepared, official authorisation given and the documentation relating to the operation concerned approved by all those concerned.

KEY PLAYERS

For the first shut down of the LHC a new organisational structure has been put in place. It is imperative that everyone wishing to carry out any intervention in the LHC follows the new strategy. Once a project manager or work supervisor is aware that he needs to carry out an intervention he must first contact the LHC planning and Coordination team who will give a window to carry out the work. Any person found working in the LHC without obtaining formal authorisation from the planning will be removed. Planning is supported and assisted by the general coordination team. The team is made up of the six LHC Site Coordinators whose new role is divided into three separate but equally important tasks. The first being assistant to the general coordination for his sector, the second as his title suggests, he coordinates the day to day running of his site and thirdly he has been appointed territorial safety officer (TSO) for his sector. These three roles combined give the Site Coordinator the unique opportunity to provide anyone working in his sector with valuable information concerning what is happening on daily basis, he should be the first person to call in case of a problem.

STARTING WORK

Once official authorisation from the EN/MEF LHC planning and coordination team has been obtained, the next step before the work on site can physically start is to take into account the information contained in the "Work and Safety Coordination Plan" ref [1].

This is a contractual document that must be issued as part of any call for tenders related to work to be performed in the LHC. The information contained within will enable to complete the Particular Health and Safety

Plan (PPSPS), Dossier d'Intervention en Milieu Radioactif (D.I.M.R). These documents are to be completed by each contractor, subcontractor, collaborator, CERN group or staff member for the work they wish to carry out. The documents must contain the habitual general information: names, addresses, qualifications, habilitation and formation of the staff who will be working on site. It is primordial that it contains a detailed description of the work to be carried out, what the risks are, not only for their staff but the risks they could export to others working in the area, what measures will be put in place to remove or reduce the risks and the equipment to be used to carry out the work.

HEALTH AND SAFETY COORDINATION

There are currently four qualified Health and Safety Coordinators at CERN, each one employed by different departments: BE, EN, GS, PH, EN. It was evoked during the presentation that it may be prudent in the future to employ a fifth health and safety coordinator for the TE department. This will provide the Organisation with a flexible pool of Health and Safety Coordinators with complementary skills to cover the machine shut downs and work requiring their expertise within the other departments. Their role is to help everyone working on the CERN to prevent incidents and accidents, ensure that safety is integrated throughout all activities, evaluate the risks and including those resulting from co-activity and successive activities, ensure that the general principles of prevention are implemented and the rules and regulations are respected. To enable them to fulfil their role they need the help and cooperation of all those concerned.

PROFESSIONALS CHECK LIST

The project manager or work supervisor shall verify the safety documents are sent to all those concerned including the safety coordinator for comments. Once it has been commented upon by all concerned, the Joint Inspection (VIC) can be carried out. The work supervisor will contact the safety coordinator to arrange the date for the joint inspection approximately one week before the programmed start date. There are a certain number of key players that must be present at the joint inspection. They are the contractor, subcontractor, collaborator, CERN group or staff member, the supervisor him/herself and the Territorial Safety Officer. During the visit the participates will see if there are last minute problems, see the actual site conditions, establish whether or not a cryogenic authorisation is required, or an electrical consignation for example, if this is the case TE/CRG shall be contacted and the person responsible for each zone informed so that the written cryo authorization can be issued. For all electrical consignation the contact is EN/MEF.

As the person in charge, the work supervisor will ensure that he has been given the means necessary to ensure that the written procedures can be put into operation on site. He will also ask himself the question whether or not he has been provided (or his work package contractor has provided the teams working on site) with everything needed to carry out the work safely. It is also the moment to ask any questions, if he is not sure or has doubts.

STRONG AND WEAK POINTS

The Organisation has shown over the years its redoubtable capability to get things done, to manage and control difficult situations, to meet deadlines and make the very most of the means made available to us. All of these things are very positive. However there are a number of areas where we could make some improvements that would make everyone's life much easier:

- The creation of centralized database for all safety documents, the creation of official cryogenics and pressure test documents, the replacement of the AOC/ADI with a more user friendly document.

A draft document has been drawn up and in principle approved by all departments; the document itself is a hybrid of the AOC and the ADI. The new document is called the Avis d'Execution de Travaux (AET) which will be used during the next shut down this document it will help improve our reactivity. These actions in turn would enable CERN to implement a CERN wide safety culture with the same rules for everyone.

CONCLUSION

The new CERN safety culture needs to expand throughout ALL Departments, we must nurture it, help it gather momentum and grow, we must all work together for the same common goal, we must deal with the risk at source, we must plan preventive measures as part of our daily routine and we must adapt the working conditions to the workers. It is essential that the necessary impetus comes from the very top management; they must lead by example and give the means to achieve our goals of obtaining a satisfactory safety situation for all and avoid accidents and professional illnesses.

REFERENCES

[1] https://edms.cern.ch/document/978710/